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Between the Species
Skill or Slaughter in ‘Fair
Chase:’ Animal Resistance to
Modern Sports Hunting

ABSTRACT
In philosophy of sport, the internal justification for sports hunting is
often that the chase empowers hunters to become skilled performers.
However, this internal justification for sport hunting is challenged
by two factors. One is the growing awareness that the hunted nonhuman animals themselves are skilled performers, demonstrating
agency is resisting their hunters. Another is that recent developments
in hunting practice undermine the internal justification by reducing
the necessity for hunters to refine their performance skills, in effect
allowing them to rely on technology and shortcuts in place of sportsmanship. Both factors reveal important justificatory deficits in modern sports hunting as closer to slaughter than skill.
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Introduction
Gladiatorial games permitting killing worthy opponents
given a ‘thumbs down’ by the Imperator conformed with the
moral standards of ancient Roman civilization. Today, such
games violate the most basic moral standard of modern society: respect for agency and autonomy. Killing an opponent – no
matter how worthy, and no matter how ‘fair’ the competition
– is morally out of bounds. Nevertheless, modern society continues to permit practices of sports hunting allowing the killing of non-human animal opponents from bullfighting to hare
coursing, as sporting cultural practices.
When not presented in terms of therapeutic wildlife management delivering societal goods (Holsman 2000), killing
animals for sport is often justified by emphasizing its intrinsic value for hunters, who must develop the skills of the game
if they are to defeat their animal ‘opponents’ (Morris 2014).
However, a skills-based justification for sport hunting, we contend, is increasingly undermined by new developments in the
hunting industry that change the nature or process of hunting.
‘Canned’ hunting, involving hunting in the enclosure of semiwild or captive-bred animals, along with heavily technologically mediated hunts, appear to reduce the need for hunters to
develop skills. This potentially negates performance skill as a
sports justification for killing animals. Hunters themselves are
the first to admit as much of overreliance on technology: “it’s
not real hunting” (von Essen 2017), but more like slaughter.
Replacing skill with slaughter, such a loss of justification for
sports hunting is brought into sharp relief by growing awareness of animals resisting humans in multiple contexts of interaction (Colling 2020; Allen and von Essen 2018; Hribal 2013),
including, we argue, the less explored context of sports hunt-
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ing. Appealing to criteria from the philosophy of sport, we ask
whether the canned- and techno-hunting practice that increasingly infuse modern sport hunting may properly qualify hunting as sport today, and hence, allow for an internal skills-based
justification for the practice. We also ask what animal resistance to hunters – during the tracking, chase and confrontation
– might tell us about these novel developments, as well as the
status of sports hunting generally in contemporary society.
We join scholarship on the philosophy of sports (Causey
1989; Suits 1978) concerning the normative justification of
controversial or violent games, with the recent burgeoning
animal resistance literature (Colling 2020; Allen and von Essen 2018; Hribal 2011), concerning the normative status of the
hunted. Doing so, we ask how to resolve potentially unethical
practices in modern hunting (Adams 2013); unethical insofar
as they are facilitated by ‘cheater’ technology often critiqued
as undermining our relationship with nature and animals (Jørgensen 2014). We take it for granted that no sports hunting,
strictly speaking, can be justified by utilitarian (Singer 1975)
or, even less so, deontological (Regan 1983) animal rights criteria that takes its basis in sentient individuals. Sports hunting obviously fails to pass justificatory muster based on equal
consideration for the interests of all animals or respect for them
as intrinsically valuable subjects-of-life. This is a more well
traversed field in the ethics and animal rights literature (see, for
example, Moriarty and Woods 1997; Wade 1990; Causey 1989;
Loftin 1984). Of course, on an aggregate utilitarian reasoning,
concerned foremost with overall net happiness in a population, trophy hunting for conservation may allow for the moral
permissibility of sacrificing individual animals for the species
good, who are benefited from revenue generated in hunting
tourism. However, this is a tenuous argument to make, and it is
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not clear where Singer’s original thesis would stand in relation
to this somewhat brutal utilitarian assessment.
Given these ongoing debates, we consequently restrict
our inquiry to the less explored internalism of philosophy of
sport, emphasizing the skills and virtues of hunters pursuing
authentic hunting experiences, and the externalism of Marxist approaches to sport, emphasizing the value of hunting as
commodity and source of profit. Rejecting internalist criteria,
we instead advocate a broad externalist conception of humananimal agency, supplementing Marxism with alternative externalist criteria such as biodiversity conservation.

Animal Resistance and ‘Trickster-Resistors’
Sarat Colling defines animal resistance as “an animal’s
struggle and bid for freedom against their [sic] captive or other
oppressive conditions by transgressing or retaliating against
human constructed boundaries.” Animals “resist through escape, retaliation, liberation of other animals, and everyday
defiance” (Colling 2020, 51; Allen and von Essen, 2018). In
the context of sports hunting, we focus on prey animals as
‘trickster-resistors’. They are tricksters because they evade
and deceive hunters in whatever ways they can to ensure their
survival (von Essen et al., 2020). They are also resistors because their trickery demonstrates a de facto refusal to play the
hunters’ game by “transgressing … [the] human constructed
boundaries” (Colling 2020, 51; Allen and von Essen 2018). Indeed, trickster capacities of animals have long been observed
by anthropology, making life and cultural practices difficult for
humans (Carroll 1984), but this has not been observed in relation to animal agency in resisting sport hunting.
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Here, examples of trickster-resistance range from specieslevel adaptations of mimicry and camouflage to cognitive processes in individual animals (Mitchell and Thompson 1986).
Prey animals feint, divert, play dead, or embark on even more
elaborate ruses in situations involving hunters, technology, and
dogs. Their ruses showcase intentionality, response-ability to
hunters’ actions as well as anticipations of their opponents’ reactions. Hunters recall animals doubling back on their tracks,
walking upstream, moving in circles, feigning distress, sabotaging, or making off with everything from trail cameras to
hunting rifles (von Essen et al. 2020). Beavers evade the hunters by submerging and using sticks like periscopes to breathe.
Badgers sneak onto baiting sites just after the hunters have given up and gone home. Wild boars, “will boldly stroll in front
of the property manager’s 4WD but never the hunter’s vehicle
[…] reading hunting intent” (Keil 2021, 105). Rabbits and

foxes easily fool and ‘taunt’ hunting dogs by making great
leaps or zigzagging to throw them off their scent during
the chase. By virtue of a range of trickery and ruses, animals demonstrate agency, and often quite considerable
skill, resisting hunters regarding the termination of their
lives as subject of sport. Another strand of our anecdotal
data from hunters suggests wild animals sabotaging hunts
that do not even target their species – from owls harassing hunters, giving away their position to deer, to stealing
their game both before and after the kill shot.
Sports Hunting as Justified Internally and
Externally
We now turn to the question of what defines and what justifies sports hunting of the sort that the animals considered above
can resist. As distinct from subsistence hunters hunting princi-
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pally for meat, sports hunters are “those who take an immense
pleasure in the hunt and who kill to have an authentic hunting
experience” (Causey 1989, 327). Here the ‘authenticity’ of their
experience – if it is to be a sports hunting experience – depends
on their defeating the animals they prey upon as worthy adversaries enjoying a ‘fair’ or ‘sporting’ chance of escape (Posewitz
1994). To be sure, in practice, the distinction between hunting
for the pot and hunting for the thrill is increasingly blurred.
Contemporary western hunters report multiple motivations behind their pastime, one of which is sport, but others being meat
or wildlife management (Ljung 2014).
Nevertheless, philosophers of sport typically emphasize that
all sports entail “playing a game” based on the “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 1988 [2014],
43). In soccer, for example, an unnecessary obstacle is the rule
against handballs. A game’s outcome must depend on some exercise of “skill” or performance excellence in obtaining victory
within parameters set by the rules. Establishing unnecessary
obstacles to winning, the rules of the game function as standards for judging better or worse sports performances: they are
necessary conditions for demonstrating sporting skill. Analogous to soccer players, sports hunters must demonstrate skill
overcoming unnecessary obstacles to obtaining a kill, lusory
success, that is, if they are to have an authentic hunting experience.
On the one hand, sports internalists (see for example Kretchmar 2005; Torres 2014; Suits 1978) embrace this philosophical
connection between unnecessary obstacles and skill, regarding
sport as not only defined but justified by intrinsic values to a
game, its rules, and its players. Demonstrating skill in victory
over worthy opponents is an intrinsic value spanning histori-
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cal time from ancient Greek games to the Superbowl. This remains constant despite profound changes in societal mores between classical and modern times. On the other hand, externalists (see for example Sandel 2012; Walsh and Giulianotti 2007)
reject this internalist approach, emphasizing instead external
definitional and justificatory criteria for sport. Influenced by
Marxism, they view sport primarily as a commodity with a
merely instrumental value external to the game and its rules. A
sport is defined and justified by the economic profit generates
for an investor class. As far as the class of sports investors are
concerned, arbitrary rules establishing unnecessary obstacles
for judging performance skills are irrelevant to a game’s instrumental, quotidian value in society.
Internalists strongly object to eternalists reducing sport to
such a quotidian value. This does not mean they deny sport is
also a commodity; they insist only on weighing intrinsic values
more heavily in evaluating a sport. However, we shall argue
shortly the reverse holds in the case of canned- and technologically facilitated sports hunting, such that justificatory preference must be given to a variety of external values beyond
economic profit.

Canned- and Technologically facilitated-Hunting
Canned hunting is the practice of keeping prey animals in
confined, fenced-in areas on game ranches. Their purpose is to
create a ‘hunting experience’ that increases the hunters’ odds
of obtaining a kill. It does so by, among other things, reducing
the need for hunters to acquire the skills necessary to track prey
animals in the wild. On the whole, the enterprise is more about
product than process. As Ireland notes, a selling point is: “Bag
a trophy, guaranteed kill, no kill, no pay” (Ireland 2020, 223).
Despite its lucrative value, South Africa banned canned hunt-
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ing in April 2021. Already in 2006, widespread public attention
was directed toward the case of Troy Gentry of the country
music duo Montgomery Gentry, who bought and shot a tame
bear, ‘Cubby’ in an enclosed pen. Gentry then tagged Cubby’s
corpse giving the impression of having killed him in the wild
before memorializing his supposed ‘wild kill’ in a videotape.
In similar vein to canned hunts, technologically facilitated
hunting aim to reduce the odds of lusory failure, pertaining to
the game, by any number technological enhancements to the
hunters’ arsenal. Such enhancements include infrared, motionsensitive trail cameras alerting hunters’ smartphones to animal
presences (thus doing away with tracking), laser scope rifles
allowing them to take aim well beyond the animal’s sensory
range, and the use of drones chasing animals by concealed
shooters. One notable case of technologically facilitated hunting in Texas involved the use of a webcam and remotely controlled gun, allowing hunters to shoot live animals from their
computers. According to the Humane Society of the United
States, most such ‘techno-hunts’ involve game ranches penning animals in a morbid marriage of canning and technology. Hunters and writers on hunting, again, are mostly critical
of these developments, declaring them as ‘cancers’ (Kerasote
1994; Loftin 1984), undermining already tenuous public support for hunting.

Two Claims concerning Canned- and TechnoHunting
We now consider two claims concerning the status of
canned- and techno-hunting as sport. The first claim is that
neither qualify as sport by internal criteria for sports hunting.
Both are cases of drastically making it easier for hunters by removing ‘unnecessary obstacles’ posed by the natural trickery
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and resistance of prey animals: hiding, running, feinting and
more. That is, they remove these obstacles by confining animals or deploying high-tech advantages to counter their skills
of evasion and escape in order for the hunter to obtain a kill.
Moreover, both forms reduce the need for hunters to demonstrate physical and cognitive performance skill to achieve lusory success. Neither therefore appear to satisfy internal criteria
for sport, insofar as they do away with the need for excellence
and what most agree are key constitutive skills of hunting as
a sport.
The second claim is that both canned- and technologically facilitated hunting do qualify as sport by external criteria
only. Elaborating on the Marxist paradigm, both have a variety
of external commodity uses. They provide a basis of profitability for sports entrepreneurs investing in game ranches and
developing ever more sophisticated equipment. For example,
as affluent urbanites (Tickle 2018; von Essen and Allen 2017),
consumers of canned- and techno-hunting get to ‘feel’ like
they are having an authentic hunting. They also get to enjoy the
benefits of status-signaling among peers based on having the
disposable income to afford expensive game ranches and hightech equipment. Indeed, they may even get to tell themselves
they are conservation ‘heroes’ for paying heavy trophy hunting fees going toward biodiversity conservation, and so on. As
commodity, both canned- and techno-hunting therefore satisfy
external criteria for sport through a variety of values in use
for consumers, in addition to profitability for the entrepreneurs
and investors.

Objections
Nevertheless, we also recognize and engage with some objections to these two claims. An objection to the first claim
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concerning canned hunting as unethical and unsporting might
be that a low skill game is still a game. For example, the British
pub game, ‘shove ha-penny’ is a decidedly low skill competition, one that players typically enter into while drunk. However, it remains a competitive game recognizing victory may be
claimed on the basis of alcoholically diminished performance
skills. Consequently, a low skill (or diminished skill) game is
still a game. By analogy with shove ha-penny, canned hunting
is still properly a sports hunting game – offering an authentic
hunting experience – despite the diminished skill-levels it requires from the hunters based on confining prey animals (as
opposed to getting drunk).
Moreover, an objection concerning technologically facilitated hunting might be that technological innovations in hunting
are far from easily manipulated shortcuts to a kill. They require
great training and know-how to operate efficiently, often involving customization. Flying a drone in a forested area so as
to effectively flush out an animal might be seen as ‘cheating,’
but it is not something that can be achieved on the first try.
Likewise, traps are a particular kind of technology in hunting seen as cheating by many (Loo 2001). They do away with
the present, physical, direct entanglement of hunting by not allowing animals a chance to fight back. Nevertheless, traps can
be impressive technological constructions, finely calibrated to
weather and animals’ umwelts, involving elaborate concealment, boiling and scenting of trap parts so as to attract the right
species in the right time (von Essen et al. 2020). Consequently,
these new developments in hunting that ostensibly appear to
reduce the need for skill in hunting success also invite skill
development alongside new dimensions, which may or may
not have merit on their own. Of course, the question remains
whether these new skills of manipulating technology ought to
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be considered within the lusory remit of hunting, and hence
characterize a good and skilled hunter, or whether they should
be regarded skills external to this.
As concerns the second claim that canned and techno-hunting qualify as sport but on external criteria only, an objection
could be that it focuses too narrowly on the Marxist reduction
of sport to commodification and profitability. As pointing beyond the Marxist paradigm, both canned- and techno-hunting
may also satisfy external criteria instrumentally promoting
environmental and humane values. First, the sums of money
that businesses for trophy hunters generate may be directed towards biodiversity conservation (Ripple et al. 2016). This may
be seen as a dubious and at times ruthless utilitarian practice
of sacrificing the lives of worthy opponents for “environmental
balance” (Vitali 1990). However, on external environmentalist
grounds, game ranches may spare nature habitat from potentially more destructive land-uses (including intensive agriculture) and keeping up the numbers of endangered species (Dobson 2012; Ripple et al. 2016). Second, some defenders of the
practice argue enclosing animals for trophy hunting can be a
mercy to animals who would otherwise live short, tragic, and
suffering lives in the wild, at risk from poachers and nature’s
brutality (von Essen and Allen 2020). This may be consistent
with humane values if – up until their kill – animals are provided veterinary care, feeding, and protection from poachers. Indeed, trophy hunting bases its very business model on habitiats
with abundant, large, and healthy animals. To be sure, knowledge concerning the care and wellbeing of wild animals kept
in ranches, rather than in other habitats, is limited, and there
is certainly reason to suspect some are exposed to additional
harms they would not meet in the wild.
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Nevertheless, lusory victories obtained through canning
animals and relying on advanced weapons technology may
satisfy humane criteria, if the kills are ‘clean.’ Causey notes
trophy hunters partaking in canned hunts and technologicallymotivated hunters “adopt any and all … shortcuts to … compensate for the skills they are not willing or able to develop
(Causey 1989, 333). While problematic on internalist criteria,
‘shortcuts to killing’ ensure hunters dispatch their prey quickly
and efficiently, that is, cleanly. Their hunting practices may
count as humane because they spare prey animals from lengthy
and stressful chases internal to the game, intense skirmishes in
which wildlife desperately fight back, evade stressful chases
by dogs, or exposure to weapons taking great skill but with a
higher risk of maiming, like hunting bows. Research on hunters embracing modern technology shows a majority endorse
such humane external justification. They regard positively the
fact that these new weapons, trackers, and aids reduce the time
of disturbing the animal, ensure cleaner and safer kills, and enable quick and efficient tracking efforts if the animal is wounded (von Essen 2017).

Replies
How might we reply to these objections? In response to the
first one, we say low skill games leave us with nothing much
to judge as either better or worse. This obviously presents a
serious problem for any internalist definition and justification
of sports, concerned with making comparative judgments of
performance skill. Such judgments fundamentally depend on
rules of the game establishing unnecessary obstacles to victory. However, rules permitting canning and technological
enhancements reduce the prospects of lusory failure. They,
therefore, also quite significantly quash any opportunities for
making comparative judgments of skill.
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In reply to the second objection, we say the emphasis among
Marxists on commodification and profitability is indeed too
narrow – too reductive – as an approach to defining and justifying sports that are violent and involve the taking of animal
lives. However, we also say that appeal to alternative externalist criteria, such as biodiversity conservation and ‘clean kills,’
actually does nothing to undermine the claim that canned- and
techno-hunting qualify as sport on external criteria only. Indeed, as likewise external to sports as games defined by internal performance standards, conservationist and humane criteria prove necessary supplements to Marxism. Together, they
provide a richer externalist approach to defining and possibly
justifying violence and lethality in sports hunting. For them
to gain traction among an increasingly hunting-skeptical public, advocates for canned and techno hunting should deploy a
variety of external sports criteria, beyond the econometric and
quotidian. As we noted above, many hunters themselves endorse such a broad appeal to external sports criteria (von Essen
2017).

Conclusions
We conclude that canned hunting has little or no inherent
value as sport based on developing hunting skills by accepting unnecessary obstacles. For it to count as a sport on internal criteria, this form of hunting would have to build back in
obstacles to lusory success. However, that would be contrary
to the purpose of game ranches as increasing the odds of a
kill for client hunters. By contrast, techno-hunting fares somewhat better on internal criteria. Whether it counts as sport will
depend on the particular technology deployed by hunters and
how. No skills-based value is realized by hunters shooting from
computers when animals step in front of trail cameras realize
no skills-based value. However, such value is realized by hunt-
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ers operating drones across wild terrain, or devising complex
weather-sensitive traps, requiring them to develop new and
difficult performance skills. A separate, but equally important
issue, may be when in the process of hunting technological
‘shortcuts’ are employed. It is generally frowned upon to rely
on technology to tell you when and where an animal is, or indeed the stalking of the animal, but when it comes to the kill
shot, greater accuracy and deadliness of the kind ensured by
rangefinders and sharp weapons, appear to be in line with hunting credos of minimizing harm.
That said, we conclude the instrumental value of sport is
vital to both canned- and techno-hunting. The lusory goal of
obtaining a kill makes hunting a singularly controversial kind
of sport in modernity. Hunters’ skill and “pleasure” in an “authentic” experience of hunting hardly compensates for loss of
animal life. Internal criteria alone are insufficient to justify
sports hunting in modernity. This is made clear in the cases of
canned- and techno-hunting to the extent hunters fail – either
wholly or partly – to satisfy such skills-based criteria. For it
to be widely accepted as legitimate, sports hunting must also
satisfy a range of external criteria, not just economic, but also
environmental and humane. Here the practical necessity for
justificatory criteria external to the norms and values of sporting practice is brought into sharp relief by the phenomenon
of animal tricker-resistors. Such animals demonstrate agency
and high-level performance skills of their own eluding hunters
in what is for them a struggle for their lives. This exposes the
moral and intellectual paucity of sports hunting, absent appropriate external justifications for taking their lives.
Granted no such justification is likely to be forthcoming
from utilitarian or deontological animal rights, our discussion
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raises broad themes concerning how technology diminishes
or tarnishes human-animal and human-nature interactions.
Canned- and techno-hunting, perhaps, border on ‘armchair’
engagement with nature and wild animals to some (Jørgensen
2014). They fail to qualify as authentic hunting experiences by
refusing to engage complex relationships of agency between
humans and animals. Moreover, such complex relations of human-animal agency extend well beyond a Marxist paradigm
focusing exclusively on consumption and commodification.
Any plausible justification for sports hunting must foreground
such relations of interspecies agency concerning living and dying in “the figures of natural cultural history” (Haraway 2016,
28). This becomes urgent considering infrastructural changes
to hunting practice, such as canning prey animals, and technological advances in the efficient killing of tricky and resourceful animal resistors.
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